We present a new method to extract from a classical proof of ∀x(
Introduction.
Since Griffin and Felleisen [7, 8] , we know a relation between classical proofs and programs. However, it is not true that from a classical proof of the existence of an object you can compute this object. This would clearly be a contradiction with the existence of provably total but non computable functions (such as a function saying if a Turing machine will stop or not).
There are two ways of extracting a program from a classical proof:
• To associate to the absurdity rule a special control operator (the C operator of Felleisen also used by Krivine [11] ) or the µ binder of Parigot [15, 16] .
In this case, the proof and the theorem are unchanged, but the complexity of the operator can make it difficult to understand the obtained algorithm.
• To translate the proof to intuitionistic logic using a Gödel translation or similar methods adding negations in the formula.
In this case, it may be easier to understand the algorithm (the control operator is replaced by highly functional programs) but the theorem is changed.
Let us examine informally what happens with a classical proof of ∀x(N[x] → ∃y(N[y] ∧ S[x, y])
) with the first approach. We will not, in general, obtain the value of y from a proof of N [x] . Nevertheless, the algorithm will indeed build a pair whose first element is in some sense a natural number y (it is a classical proof of N[y]) and whose second element is a classical proof p of S[x, y]. But, the natural y almost never satisfies the specification (this is the main difference between classical and intuitionistic proofs). However, the algorithm will backtrack and give a "better" value for y if we put together the proof p with a proof of ¬S [x, y] .
Nevertheless, Buchholz, Schwichtenberg and Berger in [2] were able to give a method to transform classical proofs into intuitionistic ones minimizing the number of negation. They identify a class of formulas (named "goal formulas") that do not need negation at all. In this case, if your formula ∀x(N[x] → ∃y(N[y] ∧ S[x, y])) is a "goal formula", then you will really get an algorithm computing y from x after transforming the classical proof.
In this paper, we present another method: we assume that S[x, y] is a decidable predicate in the sense that ∀x, y ( ) and the proof of decidability until we get, from x, a natural number y which really satisfies the specification.
The main result (section 5) in this paper is a proof that this interaction always terminates with a correct answer (we do not limit ourselves to the case where the input is a data type, only the output needs to be a data type).
We also test this method with a non trivial example (section 6 and 7): Dickson's lemma 1 (suggested in [2] and treated for a restricted case in [3] ). This is important, because with a decidable predicate, there is always a trivial algorithm enumerating all the possible outputs and testing them until it finds the correct one. This example will show that algorithms extracted from classical proofs can be far better than this trivial algorithm.
Finally we compare our method to the method presented in [2] and [12] (section 8).
The first three sections (2 to 4) of the paper present the framework and previous results we use to state and prove our main theorem.
Second order mixed logic.
The main idea of our theorem is to make interact a classical proof and an intuitionistic proof. Therefore, the natural way to prove our theorem is to use mixed logic which manipulate both classical and intuitionistic reasoning. Definition 2.1 (mixed second order formulas) They are built from a set of intuitionistic predicate variables (infinite for each arity) and a set of classical predicate variables (also infinite for each arity). We will write the intuitionistic variables X i , Y i , . . . and the classical variables X c , Y c , . . ..
Then, from a set of first order terms T build over a language L and a set of first order variables (written x, y, . . .), we build the set of formulas using the following grammar:
Definition 2.2 (classical formulas)
A formula of mixed logic is said to be classical if its right most atomic formula is build using a classical predicate variable (regardless if it is a free or a bound predicate variable).
Definition 2.3 (translation of formulas)
If A is a usual second order formula (using only one kind of predicate variable), We will write A i (resp. A c ) the formula obtained by replacing all the predicate variables in A by intuitionistic (resp. classical) predicate variables with the same name.
Definition 2.4
In second order mixed logic, there are many ways to define the usual connectives (in fact each definition is duplicated). We define the one we use here.
• ⊥ c := ∀X c X c and ⊥ i := ∀X i X i 1 We use PhoX [17] to formalize the proof and to extract and run the program. 
Remark: we will also use the same definitions for usual second order predicates with only one kind of variables, for instance
The rules of mixed logic and the corresponding λ-terms are given in the table 1. We use Krivine's λC-calculus [11] to interpret the algorithmic contents of the proofs. One should also say that the idea of Mixed logic is not new: Nour uses it to give a very general type to storage operators [14] .
Definition 2.5 If we restrict the rules of mixed logic to formulas using only one kind of predicate variables, we obtain the usual rules for intuitionistic or classical logic. We will write Γ i t : A for provability in intuitionistic logic and Γ c t : A for provability in classical logic. 3 Semantics of mixed logic.
The main tool in this paper is the semantics of mixed logic. We use Krivine's "stack semantics" [10, 11] . Definition 3.1 (stacks) A stack is a finite sequence of λ-terms. If π = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) then u π represents the term u t 1 . . . t n .
Notation 3.2 We write Λ
(ω) the set of all stacks.
Definition 3.3 (weak-head reduction)
The weak-head reduction is a relation on the λ-calculus enriched with two constants C and A. It is defined as the smallest relation such that:
• A t π t
Remark: the weak-head reduction does not preserve types, because the second rule simplifies the term by removing the C combinator. We can do that when we know that the term will not receive further arguments, which is the case in the definition of the semantics below.
Definition 3.4 (stable sets) We define P(Λ) β (resp. P(Λ) ) the set of all sets of λ-terms closed by β-equivalence (resp. closed by weak-head expansion and β-equivalence). This means that if Φ ∈ P(Λ) , t ∈ Φ and if t t or t β t then t ∈ Φ.
Definition 3.5 (stack duality) If ⊥ ⊥ is a set of λ-terms and if Π is a set of stacks, then we define Π, the dual of Π by 
Definition 3.7 (interpretation) An interpretation I is given by
• an interpretation t → |t| I from first order terms to a set D given by an interpretation of first order variables in D and an interpretation of function symbols as functions from D n to D as usual,
• a set of λ-terms ⊥ ⊥ I ∈ P(Λ) ,
• for each intuitionistic predicate variable X i of arity n a function
• for each classical predicate variable X c of arity n a function |X c | I from D n to P(Λ (ω) ). We can remark, that since ⊥ ⊥ I is closed by β-equivalence, for any
Remark: To simplify writing, in the notation for Π, we omit ⊥ ⊥. In practice, we always use this notation in a context where there is an interpretation I, and the ⊥ ⊥ being used in Π will always be ⊥ ⊥ I .
Remark(bis): in the definition of interpretation, we ask all the sets to be closed by β-equivalence while ⊥ ⊥ I is also closed by weak-head expansion. This is fundamental to get the correctness of the semantics, because intuitively, ⊥ ⊥ I is the set of programs that can really be evaluated on a machine and the reduction for C only apply to those terms.
Definition 3.8 The interpretation of a formula of mixed logic is defined by induction as follows:
Let I be an interpretation, if Γ = x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n is a context, we write σ ∈ |Γ| I if σ is a substitution such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have
Lemma 3.9 For any interpretation I, the interpretation of a formula A belongs to P(Λ) β and if A is classical, then it is the dual of a set of stacks.
Proof : By induction on the formula A:
• The atomic case is trivial.
• For the implication case, we have: |A → B| I = {t ∈ Λ | ∀u ∈ |A| I , t u ∈ |B| I }.
From that fact that |B|
I is closed by β-equivalence, we know that the same is true for |A → B| I .
Moreover, if A → B is classical, that is if B is classical, by induction hypothesis, we know that |B| I = Π for some Π ∈ Λ (ω) . Therefore, we have |A → B| I = Π with Π = {(u, t 1 , . . . , t n ) | u ∈ |A| I and (t 1 , . . . , t n ) ∈ Π}.
• For the quantification case, the closure under β-reduction is trivial. For classical formulas, the result comes from the fact that i∈I Π i = i∈I Π i . Proof : By induction on the proof of Γ m t : A using the previous lemma for the case of the two elimination rules of the second order quantifiers. We will treat the only difficult case: the case of the absurdity rule: Remark: we get easily that |⊥ c | I = {t ∈ Λ | ∀π ∈ Λ (ω) , t π ∈ ⊥ ⊥ I } and this implies that if t ∈ ⊥ ⊥ I then A t ∈ |⊥ c | I (because A t π t and ⊥ ⊥ I is closed by weak-head expansion). Moreover, we also have |⊥ c | I ⊂ ⊥ ⊥ I using the empty stack. We choose σ ∈ |Γ| I and define t = tσ. By induction hypothesis, we have
We must prove C t ∈ |A| I . We know that A is classical and therefore, we know that |A| I = Π = {u ∈ Λ | ∀π ∈ Π, u π ∈ ⊥ ⊥ I }. Therefore, we choose π ∈ Π and we must prove C t π ∈ ⊥ ⊥ I . Because ⊥ ⊥ I is closed by weak-head expansion, it is enough to prove t λx.(A (x π)) ∈ |⊥ c | I ⊂ ⊥ ⊥ I . To do so, using the induction hypothesis, it is sufficient to prove λx.(A (x π)) ∈ |A → ⊥ c | I . Then, we choose v ∈ |A| I and we prove (λx.
By the previous remark, we just have to prove (v π) ∈ ⊥ ⊥ I which is true because v ∈ |A| I = Π and π ∈ Π.
Results about data types.
We give now a definition of "data types". There are many possible definitions (see [6] ) and nobody knows if they are all equivalent. The one we give is a variation on these definitions, suited for our theorem. What is really important is that the data types we use verify this definition.
Definition 4.1 An interpretation I is faithful for a given data type if the interpretation of all its constructors (which are function from D n to D) are injective functions with disjoint images.
Definition 4.2 (Data types)
A data type is a second order predicate O[x] with only one free first-order variable, such that
• O has only positive second-order quantification (it may have negative firstorder quantification).
• For any faithful interpretation I, if t ∈ |O i [x]| I then there exists a λ-term t and a closed first order term u such that t β t , i t : O[u] and |x| I = |u| I .
Lemma 4.3
If O is a data type, then we have the following properties:
The converse is in general not true.
• For any faithful interpretation I, if t ∈ |O i [x]| I then t is β-equivalent to a closed term.
Proof : The first property is immediate because O has only positive universal quantifiers and no free second order predicate variable. The second property is a trivial consequence of the second property in the definition.
Proposition 4.4
The following types are data types, if D is a data type itself (we assume that the language contains the constants 0 and nil, the unary function symbol S and the binary function symbol "::"):
this is the type of Church numerals.
•
this is the type of lists of elements of D.
Proof : See [6, 9] . We will at least give the proof for natural numbers. Let I be a faithful interpretation for natural number. This means that the interpretation of 0 is always distinct from the interpretation of S(x) and that the interpretation of S is injective. Let us assume that t ∈ |N i [x]| I . Then, we choose two λ-variables a and b not free in t and we define Φ a function from
) and Φ(u) = ∅ otherwise. From this and the faithfulness of I, it is clear that a ∈ |X(0)
. Therefore, we have |x| I = |S n (0)| I for some n ∈ N. Let n be the Church numeral for n. We have n : N i [n]. And moreover, from t a b β b n a we deduce easily t β n.
Proposition 4.5
We can now type some operators we will need later:
Then we can prove in mixed logic for
Proof : Z, S, N and C are the constructors for church numerals and lists. 
which is indeed a classical formula. Then, the proof is easy and leads to the given terms.
Remark: the terms T N and T L N are storage operators [10] respectively for Church numerals and lists. Moreover, the type given here is the most general type known for storage operators [14] but we do not use here the fact that they are storage operators, just the fact that they transform classical integers [11] into intuitionistic integers which is immediate from the correctness of the semantics.
5 The main theorem.
be three predicates such that:
Then, we define the following terms (the terms B[i] and C[i] depend on a parameter i, and these definitions are adjusted to avoid administrative redexes): . Then, (q s) is a proof of ⊥ and the interaction of q and s will make the classical program P backtrack to propose another o until the program terminates on a success (the program will always terminates).
λs.(T o λo.(B[i] o s)))))
Remark: We will not only prove the theorem, we will also prove that the term C[i] behaves as described above. This can be expressed by the following theorem: Theorem 5.2 Using the hypotheses and notation of theorem 5.1, If i i : I[u] then there exists n ∈ N and two sequences of terms o 0 , . . . , o n and s o , . . . , s n such that: Before proving the two theorems, we need the following lemma:
Proof (of the lemma): We consider t the normal form of t (it exists and is typable because second order intuitionistic logic is strongly normalizable and satisfies subject reduction). Then, by considering the applicable rules for a normal proof of i t : P ∨ Q, we get t = λxλy(x s P ) or t = λxλy(y s Q ) with in the first case x : P → X, y : Q → X i s P : P and in the second case x : P → X, y : Q → X i s Q : Q. Moreover, the variable X is not free in P and Q.
Therefore, for any interpretation I and all terms u and v we have u
. By the adequation lemma, we have
Similarly, we have s P [x/u, y/v] ∈ |P c | I , because x : P → X, y : Q → X i s P : P implies x : P → X, y : Q → X c s P : P and Λ = ∅ is a possible classical interpretation for the variable X .
For the typability of s P , we have x : P → X, y : Q → X i s P : P implies x : P → I, y : Q → I i s P : P with I = ∀X(X → X) which implies i s P [x/u, y/u] : P because we can prove i u : P → I and i u : Q → I with u = λxλy y.
The proof for s Q is identical. Remark: from this proof, we see that it is essential that t be typable of type I[u] to ensure in some sense that t belongs to both the classical and intuitionistic interpretation of I [u] . For the same kind of reasons, it is important that O is a data type.
Proof (of the two main theorems): We assume the hypotheses of the theorems:
First, we choose five distinct λ-variables α, α , δ, γ and γ not free in P , D, T and i (easy, these are closed terms). Then, we introduce the following terms:
We clearly have Remark: the definition of ⊥ ⊥ is not circular and does not depend on I because O i uses only intuitionistic variables and one free first order variable. It is also clear that ⊥ ⊥ is closed by weak-head expansion and β-equivalence and the ⊥ ⊥ is not empty (because of the first case).
Remark: we always have ⊥ ⊥ = {∅}, so ⊥ ⊥ is a possible interpretation of a classical proposition (notice that ⊥ ⊥ is not the interpretation of ⊥ c ).
Then, we choose the interpretation I using the previous definition of ⊥ ⊥ I = ⊥ ⊥ and such that I(X c ) = ⊥ ⊥.
Now the proof is decomposed in four parts:
This is immediate from the definition of ⊥ ⊥ and because I(X c ) = ⊥ ⊥. The second case would mean we reached the last step α o 0 s 0 and n = 1. In the first case, we have B [i] o n s n γ s n q n . Then, q n [α/α , γ/γ ]s n does not contain the variable α and γ and therefore reduces to a term δ o n−1 s n−1 (because it belongs to ⊥ ⊥). We can continue this reasoning until we reach the final step α o 0 s 0 , keeping the property that α and γ never occur in o j nor s j for any j. 
Next, we prove C [i] ∈ ⊥ ⊥. From the first hypothesis of the theorem, we have
P ∈ |∀x(I c [x] → ∃ c y(O c [y] ∧ c S c [x, y]))| I which implies P i ∈ |∃ c y(O c [y] ∧ c S c [u, y]))| I . This implies that P i ∈ |∀y(O c [y] ∧ c S c [u, y] → X c ) → X c | I .(a) C[i] B[i] o n σ s n σ (b) B[i] o n σ s n σ B[i] o n−1 σ s n−1 σ (c) . . . (d) B[i] o 2 σ s 2 σ B[i] o 1 σ s 1 σ (e) B[i] o 1 σ s 1 σ A o 0 σ s 0 σ (f) A o 0 σ s 0 σ o 0 σ (g) o 0 σ β o 0 because o 0
is element of the data type O and therefore it is
β-equivalent to a closed term.
This gives the intended behavior of C. We now have to prove that o 0 satisfies the specification.
We know that B (f 1 , . . . , f n ) of functions from N to N, there is an unbounded subset X of N such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, f i restricted to X is an increasing function.
Corollary 6.2 (Weak Dickson's lemma)
For any finite sequence (f 1 , . . . , f n ) of functions from N to N, there are arbitrary large finite subsets X of N such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, f i restricted to X is an increasing function.
We will use the method described in this paper to compute these arbitrary large finite subset X of N. First we need to give a more detailed description of the formalization, in PhoX [17] , of the lemmas and some hints about the proof:
which means that x is a minimum of f on the subset Q of N. Then, we can prove the minimum principle:
Proof : The proof uses absurdity reasoning and the well founded induction principle on N.
Lemma 6.4 Now, we define the following predicates : Proof (of Dickson's lemma): We can now formalize Dickson's lemma as
which is proved by induction on the length of the list l using the previous lemma: we get an unbounded set Q such that any point of Q is a left minimum on Q for all functions in the list which is what we wanted.
Proof (of weak Dickson's lemma): To prove Dickson's lemma we need to manipulate finite sets of naturals. We formalize finite sets as ordered lists. Then, the specification uses the following definitions:
The weak Dickson's lemma is stated as
and it is an immediate consequence of the previous lemma (by induction on the integer p) and Proof (decidability of the specification): It is stated as follows and it is easy (but long and tedious) to prove in intuitionistic logic.
It is clear that the hypotheses of our main theorems are verified. We have two predicates as inputs but this changes nothing. However, we really use the fact that inputs do not need to be data types because
and we have a storage operator for it (see proposition 4.5). Finally, the specification is S and it is decidable.
There is still one problem, in the proof we use some axioms: The axioms saying that zero is distinct from successor and the successor is injective and similar axioms for lists and length of lists. These axioms are treated as follows, taking in account the need to use the classical part of the semantics (we only treat the axioms for natural numbers, the axioms for lists are treated in the same way): Proof : For the first axiom, we assume t ∈ |0 = c Sx|
which is what we wanted. For the second axiom, we assume t ∈ |Sx = c Sy| I[x/v,y/w] , we must prove t ∈ |x = c y| I[x/v,y/w] . To do so we choose Π from D to P(Λ (ω) ) and we must prove that t ∈ Π(v) → Π(w). From the hypothesis that |S| I is an injective function, we choose a function p from D to D such that p(|S| I (u)) = u for all u ∈ D. Next, we take Π = Π • p and from the hypothesis t ∈ |Sx = c Sy|
Remark: when we use higher-order logic, the axioms saying that constructors are distinct and injective are the only ones which are really needed. Nevertheless, we can also use equational axioms to define functions or any axiom that can be "realized" by a λ-term to preserve the adequation lemma (and the later includes the axiom of dependent choice [12] !).
Using PhoX [17] , we have extracted a λ-term from the above proof and we tested it on a list of functions f 2 , . . . , f k where f i (p) = p mod i. We give below the various lists tried by the algorithm before it find the correct answer, for various values of k and various length n of the wanted lists. We give also the number of tries including the final correct answer. k = 2, n = 4 {3 tries} {3, 2, 1, 0} {4, 3, 2, 0} {5, 4, 2, 0} k = 2, n = 5 {4 tries} {4, 3, 2, 1, 0} {5, 4, 3, 2, 0} {6, 5, 4, 2, 0} {7, 6, 4, 2, 0} k = 3, n = 4 {12 tries} {3, 2, 1, 0} {4, 3, 2, 0} {4, 3, 1, 0} {5, 4, 3, 0} {6, 5, 4, 0} {7, 6, 4 , 0} {7, 6, 3, 0} {8, 7, 6, 0} {9, 8, 6, 0} {9, 7, 6, 0} {10, 9, 6, 0} {11, 10, 6, 0} k = 3, n = 5 {19 tries} {4, 3, 2, 1, 0} {5, 4, 3, 2, 0} {5, 4, 3, 1, 0} {6, 5, 4, 3, 0} {7, 6, 5, 4, 0} {8, 7, 6, 4, 0} {8, 7, 6, 3, 0} {9, 8, 7, 6, 0} {10, 9, 8, 6, 0} {10, 9, 7, 6, 0} {11, 10, 9, 6, 0} {12, 11, 10, 6, 0} {13, 12, 10, 6, 0} {13, 12, 9, 6, 0} {14, 13, 12, 6, 0} {15, 14, 12, 6, 0} {15, 13, 12, 6, 0} {16, 15, 12, 6, 0} {17, 16, 12, 6, 0} It is clear that the number of tries is far below the number of subsets enumerated by a stupid algorithm. Moreover, it seems that this proof of Dickson's lemma gives the first answer for the lexicographic order (this is not at all true for all proofs).
Simplification of the algorithm
It is possible, by analyzing the proof (the formalization in PhoX is not very long: 343 lines including the proof of decidability), to extract (by hand) a simplified algorithm omitting parts of the proof which are not useful for the computation.
The program is written in ObjectiveCaml. The C operator has been removed using a CPS translation (callcc is not available in ObjectiveCaml) and the program needs recursive types to be accepted (use ocaml -rectypes). We now describe briefly the program.
The first function lem1 corresponds to the lemma 6.3:
let lem1 f e k = let rec k' x q = k (x : int) ((f,k')::q) in e k'
The algorithmic content of the fact that N is well founded has been simplified using a recursive definition. The C operator has been replaced by the continuation k. To make the program more readable, we have stored in a list the proof that the wanted integer belongs to the desired set. The list ((f,k')::q) is the algorithmic content of the fact that x is a minimum of f (represented by the pair (f,k')) and of the fact that x belongs to Q represented by q. The continuation k' in the pair (f,k') allows this function to backtrack if x is not a minimum of f. In this case, k' will receive in argument an integer y such that f (y) < f (x) and such that y belongs to Q. Then, the function will call again the continuation k with y instead of x.
The lemma Finally, the proof of decidability (function decidable) checks that the list satisfies the specification calling the continuation stored in the list to make the program backtrack if it is not the case. The program had to be adjusted to do the check in the same order as the term extracted from the proof. Remark: the storage operator is not useful for this proof because the proof only constructs intuitionistic lists of naturals. This is often the case but not always (you can build examples where the storage operator will be really used to translate classical data into intuitionistic ones).
If you replace the comment "(* side effect to print l *)" by some code to print the integers in the list l, you will get exactly the same behavior (except that it is much faster) as the program extracted from the proof. This gives a strong argument to check that we did nothing wrong when simplifying the program extracted from the proof.
This program is surprisingly short and efficient and it seems that it would have been very hard to find such an algorithm directly. This means that even for a quite simple specification and a short proof, our theorem and a classical proof can lead to an interesting algorithm which is hard to construct directly.
Comparison with other work
comparison with the work of Berger, Buchholz and Schwichtenberg [2] In [2] the authors have chosen a completely different approach by finding some means to transform the classical proof in an intuitionistic one. They do not use a Gödel translation. They use a logical framework with only one decidable predicate symbol and only the connectives ⊥, →, ∀ which implies that classical and intuitionistic logic are equivalent in this setting.
However, to code the formula you want to prove, you need to add negations (at least two negations for the existential quantifier because the formula you want to prove is ∀x∃yG[x, y]).
Then, the authors prove that if G is a so called "goal formula" and if you prove
where M is a functional program computing y from x.
We could consider that goal formulas play a similar role as decidable predicates, but what is the relation between these two notions ? Goal formulas do not necessarily define decidable predicates (they may contain universal quantifications), but in this case the method in [2] will probably not lead to an algorithm ?).
A first clue is that, in our method, if we change the decidability proof, it changes the order in which we check that the solution is correct and the program behaves differently. In [2] it seems that lemma 3.1 plays a similar role. This lemma says that for any goal formula G, we can prove that [3] , using the method in [2] , a program is extracted from a restricted version of Dickson's lemma (only two functions and two natural numbers) and is very similar to ours. . . comparison with [12] In this paper, Krivine shows how the λC-term extracted from a classical proof can be directly used as a winning strategy for Coquand's game semantics [4] . Krivine studies formulas written ∀x 1 ∈N∃y 1 ∈N . . . ∀x n ∈N∃y n ∈N Φ (x 1 , y 1 , . . . , x n , y n ) = 0 where Φ is a recursive function.
Therefore, the case n = 1 (∀x∈N∃y∈N Φ(x, y) = 0) is a particular case of our work because the equality is decidable and it is very easy to make the λC-term extracted from a classical proof computes y from x (intuitively, because the decidability proof is trivial).
What do we gain by using formulas of the shape ∀x∈N∃y∈N S(x, y) instead of ∀x∈N∃y∈N Φ(x, y) = 0 ? First it is easy to go from one to another (the second case is a particular case of the first one and from a decidable predicate we can easily get a recursive function). However, it would be very difficult to analyze the behavior of the classical proof of Dickson's lemma (or any large proof), because the decidability proof (which has an obvious algorithmic contents) is replaced by a proof that ∀x∈N∀y∈N (S(x, y) ↔ (Φ(x, y) = 0)). Moreover, in our paper the program is a well analyzed interaction between two components: the intuitionistic decidability proof and the classical existence proof, which helps a lot in understanding the whole program (this is the main point of our theorem). In Krivine's work, there is only one monolithic proof to analyze.
One should note that Krivine's work is more general because proofs can use the axiom of dependent choice and the alternation of quantifiers is not limited (but in this case we can not anymore compute the value of y 1 from x 1 ).
It is clear that our work can be extended to use the axiom of dependent choice because the justification uses the same semantics and there is only to prove that the term chosen for the axiom of choice preserves the adequation lemma which is the case.
We also think that Krivine's work can be extended to formula of the shape ∀x 1 ∈N∃y 1 ∈N . . . ∀x n ∈N∃y n ∈N S(x 1 , y 1 , . . . , x n , y n ) where S is a decidable predicate using our technics, but this needs to be checked.
Further works
There is at least two open questions:
1. What is the relation between goal formulas and decidable formulas and more generally, can we prove a syntactical result similar to our theorem: * is a Gödel translation of S ?". This would allow a proof similar to the proof that all functions provably total in classical second order logic are provably total in intuitionistic logic.
2. There is a huge difference between the extracted term and the simplified program. Can we reduce these differences automatically using methods similar to those in [1, 5, 13] developed for intuitionistic logic. However, with classical logic, there is one added problem compared to intuitionistic logic: the equational reasoning can have an algorithmic content: the equality proofs can trigger the backtracking of the program.
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